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After the turn of the century, improvements in transportation and 
the mobility of goods in the marketplace made this less common. In 
the MacPherson case, for example, the plaintiff was injured when a 
wheel on an automobile collapsed.1 In an earlier time, it would have 
been unlikely that MacPherson would have purchased a fully-
functional vehicle from a manufacturer located half a continent away; 
instead, he would have acquired it from the local wagon-maker and 
wheelwright. MacPherson would have known the abilities of his 
neighbors, and could have inspected the cart and wheel as they were 
made to discover any defects. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, however, the customer in New York was buying a completed 
product from a retail distributor who had acquired it from the 
manufacturer in Michigan who had, in turn, acquired the wheel from 
another manufacturer in some unknown location.2 
The new technologies of interchangeable parts and mechanized 
assembly lines allowed this to occur.3 As the courts recognized in 
MacPherson and similar cases, the industrial age required new rules. 
The old legal rule that focused on the product’s inherent 
dangerousness no longer served the purpose of promoting safety.4 
With remote customers acquiring technologically sophisticated 
products, a new rule was needed.5 
A more comprehensive example of law changing in response to 
new technology can be found by examining the technology of 
publishing and the legal response in the form of copyright law, from 
their foundations in the fifteenth century to today. Before Gutenberg 
invented the movable type press in 1436,6 there was no need for 
copyright law. During that time, a scribe would require hundreds to 
                                            
1 Id. 
2 See id. 
3 See generally Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and 
the Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 14–15 (2005) 
(examining incidents of defects and the need for public and private inspection after 
automobile mass production was made possible by the assembly line and 
interchangeable parts). 
4 See David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 
955, 966-69 (2007). But Cf. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 
1931) (“The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.”). 
5 See Owen, supra note 4, at 969. 
6 Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the 
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH 1, 3 (1988). 
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thousands of hours to hand copy another’s work.7 The inaccuracy and 
high cost of the process made it prohibitive for most.8 The movable 
type press mitigated both of these problems. Although it would take 
several hours to set each page of a book in type, thousands of copies of 
the page could be produced rapidly thereafter.9 Further, as the type 
was set, errors could be identified and eliminated.10 Consequently, the 
overall time it took to accurately reproduce a work dropped 
dramatically. 
The common law system first addressed the changes wrought by 
the movable type press technology in England. Not long after the 
invention of the press, the King gave the Stationers Company a royal 
prerogative to control the publication of books, which included the 
ability to prohibit piracy.11 Eventually, the Licensing of the Press Act 
of 1662 granted the Company complete control over what was printed 
in England.12 Not surprisingly, this private control of printing led to 
abuses stemming particularly from the perpetual protection of works.13 
Parliament responded in 1710 with the Statute of Anne, which 
established a system of protecting printed works that we can recognize 
as copyright protection.14 
                                            
7 LEILA AVRIN, SCRIBES, SCRIPT AND BOOKS 128 (2010) (“A scribe could write 
between six and sixteen pages a day, and perhaps wrote for six and seven hours a day 
in a five- or six-day workweek, excluding holidays.”). 
8 See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE 
46–47 (1979) (Noting, in a discussion of scrivener accuracy versus print accuracy, 
that “. . .it is doubtful whether one should refer to ‘identical copies’ being 
‘multiplied’ before print.”); see also id. at 72 (On cost, the author notes that, after the 
press, students and scholars could undertake much broader studies because 
“. . .printing made books cheap and plentiful.”). 
9 See generally FRAN REES, JOHANNES GUTENBERG: INVENTOR OF THE PRINTING 
PRESS 50–56 (2006) (explaining movable type setting process). 
10 SABRINA ALCORN BARON ET AL., AGENT OF CHANGE: PRINT CULTURE 
STUDIES AFTER ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN 144 (2007). 
11 Isabella Alexander, All Change for the Digital Economy: Copyright and 
Business Models in the Early Eighteenth Century, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1351, 
1356–57 (2010) (describing the Licensing Act of 1662). To be fair, it seems clear 
that the primary goal of the Stationers Company was to censure works that portrayed 
the King or the Church in an unfavorable light more than it was to provide copyright 
to authors and publishers. See id. at 1356. 
12 Id. at 1356–57. 
13 See id. at 1357. 
14 Id. at 1359 (Most importantly, the Statute of Anne limited the duration of the 
protections received by an author or publisher.). 
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In the United States, the Statute of Anne was in force as part of 
each state’s common law as the U.S. established its independence from 
England.15 In the first Congress, the Copyright Act of 1790 was passed 
providing limited nation-wide copyright protection.16 Similar to the 
rights afforded by the Statute of Anne,17 the new Copyright Act gave 
authors the right to publish and vend books, maps, and charts, and, by 
its very terms, was limited to preventing verbatim copying of the 
work.18 Throughout this time—from the Stationers Company through 
the adoption of the 1790 Act—publishing technology was stable, 
subject only to incremental improvement, so no fundamental legal 
changes were required.19 
In 1798, however, the invention of the lithographic press radically 
altered publishing technology and continued the trend of decreasing 
printing costs.20 Furthermore, as chromolithography became 
commonplace in the mid to late 1800s, multi-color printing became 
practical.21 With technologically feasible and affordable multi-color 
printing, such things as posters and pictures could be reproduced with 
the speed that had previously only applied to text.22 In response to this 
technological advancement, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 
1831 to begin covering some of these works.23 However, it was not 
until the 1870 Act that color lithographs became fully protected by 
copyright law.24 
                                            
15 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright 
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 585–86 (2010) (describing proliferation of the Statute of 
Anne into Colonial American state laws). 
16 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). 
17 See Van Houweling, supra note 15, at 585–86. 
18 See supra note 16, § 1 (“the author . . . of any map, chart, book . . . shall have 
the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending such map, 
chart, or book for the like term of fourteen years . . .”). 
19 ROBERT WEDGEWORTH, WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBRARY AND 
INFORMATION SERVICES 228–229 (1993). 
20 ELIZABETH R. PENNELL & JOSEPH PENNELL, LITHOGRAPHY AND 
LITHOGRAPHERS: SOME CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE ART 5, 238 (1915). 
21 DAVID PANKOW, TEMPTING THE PALETTE: A SURVEY OF COLOR PRINTING 
PROCESSES 32 (2005). 
22 See id. 
23 See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 7, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 438 (repealed 
1870) (The Act also provided for copyright protection for musical compositions for 
the first time.). 
24 Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909). 
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In the last century, the speed of technological innovation increased 
significantly. Six major newly developed technologies stressed the 
bounds of copyright law: recorded music, movies, radio, television, 
photocopiers, and computers.25 Congress’ first response to these new 
technologies was to repeatedly amend the Copyright Act until finally, 
in the mid-1970s, a completely new approach was used. 
The first major technology faced by Congress was the mechanical 
reproduction of sound.26 Although musical compositions had been 
eligible for copyright protection since the Copyright Act of 1831, 
when the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the player-piano 
roll, it determined that it did not represent the same thing as the 
copyrighted song and, thus, the roll did not infringe the copyright in 
the musical composition.27 This problem, among others, led to a major 
revision of copyright law: the Copyright Act of 1909.28 The 1909 Act 
greatly broadened the types of works that could be copyrighted.29 
Soon after the 1909 Act was adopted, however, more new 
technologies were invented and entered into the marketplace; this led 
to a series of amendments throughout the 1900s. For example, 
amendments passed in 1912 addressed radio broadcasts30 of musical 
compositions31 and motion pictures.32 As copyright amendments 
                                            
25 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect 
Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 143 passim 2007 (discussing the application of the result reached in 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The court 
held that there was no secondary copyright infringement liability for producing 
Betamax video recorder to other technologies which can be used for duplication.). 
26 As the phonograph was invented in 1877, it represents the earliest of the 
technologies to be addressed. See Mary Bellis, The Inventions of Thomas Edison, 
ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bledison.htm (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2012). 
27 See White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
28 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed in 1976). 
29 Id. § 5, 35 Stat. at 1076–77. 
30 Radio was invented in 1895 and moved into commercial exploitation by the 
early 1900s. See Mary Bellis, The Invention of Radio, ABOUT.COM, http: //inventors
.about.com/od/rstartinventions/a/radio.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
31 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F.2d 70, 76 
(1st Cir. 1932) (“It is now held that broadcasting musical productions for profit over 
a radio may constitute an infringement.”). Although the copyright in the musical 
composition was recognized in 1912, it was not until 1971 that the performance of 
music became copyrightable for the first time. See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 
92-140, § 1(c), 85 Stat. 391 (Lexis) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. § 402). 
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continued to be needed, particularly caused by the increasing pace of 
technological change, Congress ultimately replaced the 1909 Act in 
1976.33 Within the new act—in addition to updating the law to better 
address existing technologies34—the act addressed new technologies 
such as the photocopier,35 television,36 cable,37 and computers.38 
One of the expressed purposes of the 1976 Copyright Act was to 
prevent each new technical invention from requiring copyright law to 
be completely reworked.39 Thus far, the new approach seems to have 
worked. However, the impact of the Internet and World Wide Web on 
the effectiveness of the Copyright Act is still being measured. On the 
                                                                                                       
32 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (Lexis) (amending § 5 of the 
Copyright Act of 1909 to include “(m)— Motion pictures other than photoplays:”). 
Motion Pictures were invented in 1888. See Mary Bellis, The Inventions of Thomas 
Edison, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bledison.htm (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
33 See Copyright Act of 1976, Public Law No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 
17 U.S.C. § § 101 et seq.). 
34 See 17 U.S.C. § § 115–16 (2006) (establishing compulsory licenses in musical 
works and establishing common royalties for coin-operated record players). 
35 Cf. id. § 108 (authorizing libraries to reproduce works, which would, in 
general, require the use of a photocopier). The photocopier was invented in 1937. 
See Mary Bellis, The History of Xerox, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/od
/xyzstartinventions/a/xerox.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
36 17 U.S.C. § 112 (authorizing transmitting organization such as television 
stations to record the broadcast). Television was invented in 1906, but its 
commercialization did not occur until the late 1940s and early 1950s. See Mary 
Bellis, Television History, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/od
/tstartinventions/a/Television.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 111 (authorizing many secondary transmissions of television 
broadcasts). The first cable television systems were developed in the late 1940s to 
allow people living in remote areas to receive television. See Mary Bellis, Cable 
Television History, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors
/blcabletelevision.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
38 17 U.S.C. § 117 (establishing computer user’s rights to use copyrighted 
software). The first fully programmable digital computers were operational in the 
mid-1940s. See Mary Bellis, The History of Computers, ABOUT.COM, http: 
//inventors.about.com/library/blcoindex.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
39 See H. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5664 (“Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, 
but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. 
The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at 
the present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion into 
areas completely outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies 
neither that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression within that 
general area of subject matter would necessarily be unprotected.”). 
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positive side, the fundamental approach of the act—providing 
copyright to works fixed in a tangible medium of expression40—has 
worked for technologies invented after 1976 without requiring 
significant amendments. The new technologies of the past thirty-five 
years—such as the VCR, personal computer, Internet, CD, and 
DVD—have not required an amendment to the basic definition of what 
works are copyrightable. This is not to suggest, however, that new 
technologies have not challenged the overall effectiveness of the 
Copyright Act.41 Obviously, problems have occurred within the 
practical functioning of the law. With the speed and ease of 
duplication and distribution provided by the Internet, copyright rights 
and remedies may not provide any real protection for the author, 
particularly where music is involved.42 
What this copyright law history shows is that adaptations of the 
law in response to technology is hardly novel. The law has had to 
respond multiple times, and indeed, the speed of the changes is clearly 
accelerating. New technology means new law.43 
The articles and notes in this issue of the University of 
Massachusetts Law Review discuss this interface between technology 
and the law. Each addresses its own area: controlling the work of a 
crime laboratory; using GPS systems to prevent repeat domestic 
violence; engaging in online, virtual arbitration; controlling electronic 
discovery; and determining the effect of the First Amendment on a 
student’s use of social media. Whether the interest is in these specific 
topics or on the broader issue of legally addressing new discoveries, 
the materials within this journal are apropos. 
 
                                            
40 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
41 See generally supra note 25. 
42 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
43 Creating new law is not the only effect. New technology will often result in 
old law becoming irrelevant. When was the last time that a court was required to 
define what a “bridle-way” is? See Flagg v. Flagg, 82 Mass. 175, 178 (1860) 
(defining a “bridle-way” and distinguishing it from a “drift-way.”). 
